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Abstract
We present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial
power index for the case where issues are elements of two-dimensional
space. This characterization employs a version of the transfer condition,
which enables us to unravel a spatial game into spatial games connected
to unanimity games. The other axioms are spatial versions of anonymity
and dummy, and two conditions concerned particularly with the spatial
positions of the players. We show that these axioms are logically inde-
pendent.
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1 Introduction
Voting power in political bodies can be represented by simple games, which
identify the winning and losing coalitions: a winning coalition can enforce laws,
amendments, etc. In order to measure the power of an individual voter or
political party one can use a power index, like for instance the Shapley-Shubik
index, which is the Shapley value applied to the transferable utility game that
assigns one to winning and zero to losing coalitions. As is well known, the
Shapley-Shubik index distributes a total of one among the players by assigning
to each player the fraction of the number of player permutations in which that
player is pivotal. This way of measuring individual power, however, neither
takes the possible issues at stake into account nor the individual positions of
the players concerning these issues. In order to remedy this defect, Owen and
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Shapley (1989), following up on earlier papers of Owen (1971) and Shapley
(1977), assume that each player occupies a position in Rm: one can think of
there being m possible criteria, and a point x ∈ Rm represents a position with
respect to these criteria. An issue is then a function f : Rm → R, with the
interpretation that if f(x) ≤ f(y) then a player with position x is more in favor
of issue f , and thus more likely to support f , than a player with position y.
Owen and Shapley restrict attention to linear homogenous issues; i.e., an issue
can be represented by a vector r ∈ Rm with length one, so that a player with
position x is more in favor of r than a player with position y if r ·x ≤ r · y (dot-
products). Given a simple game and a constellation of player positions, for each
issue r a pivotal player exists, by building a coalition starting with the player
whose position has the smallest dot-product with r. Then the Owen-Shapley
spatial power index assigns to each player the fraction of issues at which this
player is pivotal. In other words, compared to the Shapley-Shubik index, the
player permutations are weighted by considering the positions of the players.
Although the model underlying the Owen-Shapley spatial power index may
seem somewhat abstract, the concept derives important support from the fact
that, at least if m = 2 and the simple game is proper and strong (meaning, for
each coalition, that either that coalition is winning and its complement losing,
or the other way around), the strong point and the center of power coincide.
The latter point is the convex combination of the player positions using the
Owen-Shapley spatial power index values as weights; and the strong point is
the Copeland winner, i.e., the position that is least vulnerable to opposition
by (winning) coalitions in terms of Euclidian distance. See Owen and Shapley
(1989) for details and a proof of this result.
Also in this paper we assume m = 2. A spatial game is a combination of
a simple game and a constellation of player positions. A spatial power index
assigns to each player in a spatial game a nonnegative number, where these
numbers sum up to one. We show that the Owen-Shapley spatial power index
is uniquely characterized by five axioms: a version of the well known transfer
condition similar to the one in Einy and Haimanko (2011); anonymity and dum-
mie axioms adapted to the spatial context; and two axioms dealing exclusively
with the spatial positions of the players. We also show that these axioms are
logically independent. As far as we are aware, this is the first characterization
of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index.
Further related literature. Without claiming completeness, we mention a few
relevant related papers. Recently, Martin et al. (2014) have extended the Owen-
Shapley spatial power index to general (sub)sets of issues and player positions.
They also clarify the difference and overlap between the original concepts of
Owen (1971) and Shapley (1977). Shenoy (1982) provides a spatial version of
another well-known power index, the Banzhaf index. Passarelli and Bar (2007)
propose a power index which is more directly based on the Euclidian distance of
player positions to issues, where the latter are points in the same space as the
player positions. They also discuss application to the EU. Benatti and Marzetti
(2013) take a generalized approach to power indexes, comprising the Shapley-
2
Shubik and Owen-Shapley power indexes, and also apply this to EU’s council
of ministers. Alonse-Meijide et al. (2011) develop an alternative spatial power
index based on lengths of paths connecting player positions and induced by
player permutations, and consider an application to the Catalan Parliament.
Also the more specific political science literature provides many interesting
references to this topic. We mention in particular Grofman et al. (1987) and
Straffin jr (1994) for overviews and applications.
Organization of the paper. Preliminaries are collected in Section 2. Section 3
provides the axioms, characterization, and logical independence, and Section 4
concludes.
2 Preliminaries
We introduce the relevant notations and concepts in different subsections.
2.1 Notations in R2
For x, y ∈ R2 with x 6= y we denote by [x, y,→) the half-line starting at x and
crossing through y. The line segment with endpoints x and y is denoted by [x, y];
the perpendicular bisector of [x, y] is the line through 12x +
1
2y perpendicular
to the line through x and y. For a point x and a line ℓ in R2 such that x /∈ ℓ
we denote by xℓ the reflection of x with respect to ℓ, i.e., ℓ is the perpendicular
bisector of [x, xℓ]. For a point x ∈ ℓ we define xℓ = x. By x¯ℓ we denote the
projection of a point x on a line ℓ, i.e., x¯ℓ = 12x+
1
2x
ℓ. For x ∈ R2, ||x|| denotes
the (Euclidean) length of x. For x = (x1, x2), y = (y1, y2) ∈ R
2, x · y denotes
the inner product of x and y, i.e., x · y = x1y1 + x2y2. For a subset X ⊆ R
2,
co (X) denotes the convex hull of X.
2.2 Simple games
A simple game is a pair (N, v), where N is a nonempty finite subset of N and
v is a function 2N → {0, 1} satisfying (a) v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1; and (b)
v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S, T ∈ 2N with S ⊆ T .1 Elements of N are called players
and subsets of N coalitions. A coalition S is winning if v(S) = 1, otherwise
it is losing. A minimal winning coalition is a winning coalition of which each
nontrivial subcoalition is losing. We denote by VN the set of all simple games
with player set N .
Player i is pivotal in S if v(S) = 1 and v(S \ {i}) = 0.
For a simple game (N, v) with at least two players and a player i ∈ N we
define the game (N \ {i}, v−i) as follows: v−i(∅) = 0 and v−i(S) = v(S ∪ {i})
for every ∅ 6= S ⊆ N \ {i}. The game (N \ {i}, v−i) can be interpreted as
player i withdrawing from (N, v) but leaving his ‘consent’ behind; in particular,
1Thus, in this paper simple games are monotonic by definition.
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a winning coalition in (N, v) remains winning in (N \{i}, v−i), i.e., also without
player i. Note that, indeed, (N \ {i}, v−i) ∈ V
N\{i}.2
2.3 Constellations
A constellation for player set N is a vector p = (pi)i∈N ∈ (R
2)N such that
pi 6= pj for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j. We denote by P
N the set of all constellations
for player set N . For p ∈ PN and i ∈ N , p−i ∈ P
N\{i} is defined by (p−i)j = pj
for every j ∈ N \ {i}. For a line ℓ in R2 and p ∈ PN , we denote pℓ = (pℓi)i∈N .
Hence, the constellation pℓ is the reflection of the constellation p with respect
to ℓ.
2.4 Spatial games
A spatial game for player set N is a triple (N, v, p) where (N, v) ∈ VN and
p ∈ PN .
Player i is a dummy in (N, v, p) if pi ∈ co ({pj | j ∈ S \ {i}}) for every
coalition S in which i is pivotal. Note that, in particular, a player who is piv-
otal in no coalition in the simple game (N, v), is a dummy. More generally,
a dummy i, even if he is pivotal in some coalition S, does not occupy an ‘ex-
treme’ position in that coalition and therefore will (almost) never exploit this
pivotalness: whatever the issue, player i will not be the last player of coalition
S to consent. This interpretation is clearly consistent with the idea underlying
the Owen-Shapley spatial power index, but it is also consistent with alternative
approaches as mentioned in the introduction. For instance, if issues are identi-
fied with points in R2 and we take the Euclidian distance as a measure of being
close to an issue, then in the situation above player i will never have maximal
distance to an issue within the coalition S, and thus will never be the last player
in S to consent.
2.5 Power indices
A spatial power index is a function ϕ which maps each spatial game (N, v, p)
to a vector ϕ(N, v, p) ∈ RN , such that ϕi(N, v, p) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and∑
i∈N ϕi(N, v, p) = 1. Note, in particular, that a spatial power index is, thus,
defined for every (finite) player set N ⊆ N.
Central in this paper is the Owen-Shapley spatial power index (Owen and
Shapley, 1989), which we define next.
Let (N, v, p) be a spatial game and let U = {r ∈ R2 | ||r|| = 1} denote
the circle with radius 1. We say that player i ∈ N is pivotal at r ∈ U if i is
pivotal in S = {j ∈ N | r · pj ≤ r · pi}. Then at each r ∈ U , except at at most
finitely many points, there is a unique pivotal player. Let ρi be the total length
of the arc(s) of U where player i is pivotal, divided by 2π (the total length of
U); so
∑
i∈N ρi = 1. Alternatively, ρi is the probability that player i is pivotal
2Also note that, even if (N, v) is proper – the complement of each winning coalition is
losing – the game (N \ {i}, v−i) does not have to be proper.
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if r is chosen from the uniform distribution over U . The Owen-Shapley spatial
power index Φ now assigns these probabilities to the spatial game (N, v, p):
Φ(N, v, p) = (ρi)i∈N .
From a geometric point of view – which we will use often in the sequel –
player i is pivotal at r if the following holds. Consider a(ny) line ℓ in R2 parallel
to r, and the projections p¯ℓj of the points pj , j ∈ N , on ℓ. Say that player j
precedes player i on ℓ if the projection p¯ℓj (weakly) precedes p¯
ℓ
i when going along
ℓ in the direction of r. If player i is pivotal in the set of preceding players (which
includes himself), then i is pivotal at r.3
To further illustrate the Owen-Shapley spatial power index, we compute it
for the case in which the game v is a unanimity game.
Example 2.1. We compute Φ for the spatial game (N,uT , p) where ∅ 6= T ⊆ N
and uT is the unanimity game on T , i.e., uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and uT (S) = 0
otherwise. The players outside T are, trivially, dummies and, in particular,
cannot be pivotal at any r ∈ U . Hence, Φi(N,uT , p) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ T and
moreover the points pi for those players play no role in determining Φj(N,uT , p)
for the players j in T . If pj ∈ co ({pi | i ∈ T \{j}}) for some j ∈ T , then again j
is a dummy in (N,uT , p), and for any line ℓ the projection p¯
ℓ
j is located between
projections of other players in T , so that j can be pivotal at at most finitely
many r; hence Φj(N,uT , p) = 0. Let T
′ consist of the remaining (non-dummy)
players in T , and let P = co ({pi | i ∈ T
′}). Thus, pi is an extreme point of P
for every i ∈ T ′. Without loss of generality suppose that P = {p1, . . . , pk} and
that the point pi is adjacent to pi−1 and pi+1 for each i ∈ T
′, where p0 = pk
and pk+1 = p1. For each i ∈ T
′ let αi denote the angle (in radians) at pi in P .
Let i ∈ T ′. We compute Φi(N,uT , p). Clearly, if k = 1 then Φi(N,uT , p) =
1. Now assume that k ≥ 2. Let ℓ be the line through pi−1 and pi and let m
be the line through pi+1 and pi. (See Figure 1.) Let ℓ
⊥ be the line through
pi perpendicular to ℓ and let m
⊥ be the line through pi perpendicular to m.
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Consider a vector r of length one starting at pi. Then the projections of the
points pj for j ∈ T
′ precede the projection of pi on the line through pi in the
direction of r if and only if r is in between ℓ⊥ and m⊥ and pointing outward
from P . It is easy to see that the (outward) angle between ℓ⊥ and m⊥ is equal
to π − αi, so that Φi(N,uT , p) = (π − αi)/2π. Since the sum of the angles at
the vertices of P is equal to (k − 2)π we have, indeed,
∑
i∈T ′
Φi(N,uT , p) =
1
2
k −
(k − 2)π
2π
= 1 .
3Verification of this claim follows from elementary geometry.
4If k = 2 then ℓ and m as well as ℓ⊥ and m⊥ coincide.
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pi−1
pi+1
pi
ℓ
ℓ
m
m
m⊥
m⊥
ℓ⊥
ℓ⊥
π − αi
αi
Figure 1: Illustrating Example 2.1
3 An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-
Shapley spatial power index
We formulate the axioms and state and prove the characterization result. Fi-
nally, we show that the axioms are independent.
3.1 The axioms
Throughout, let ϕ be a power index. The first axiom is equivalent to the well-
known transfer axiom of Dubey (1975), as remarked in Dubey et al (2005). Here
we use a different name which reflects its content in a more direct manner.
Equal Power Change (EPC) For all player sets N , all p ∈ PN , and all
v, v′, w, w′ ∈ VN , if v − v′ = w − w′ ≥ 0, then ϕ(N, v, p) − ϕ(N, v′, p) =
ϕ(N,w, p)− ϕ(N,w′, p).
EPC says that, for each constellation, if the same winning coalitions are added
when going from v′ to v as when going from w′ to w, then the change in power for
every player when going from v′ to v should be equal to the change in power when
going from w′ to w. As in Einy and Haimanko (2011), the condition will imply
that, for each fixed constellation, the power index for arbitrary simple games is
completely determined by its value on unanimity games as in Example 2.1.
The second axiom requires that dummies can be left out – while leaving
behind their consent – without any effect on the power of the remaining players.
Dummy Property (DP) For every spatial game (N, v, p) and every dummy i
in (N, v, p), ϕj(N, v, p) = ϕj(N \ {i}, v−i, p−i) for every j ∈ N \ {i}.
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The Dummy Property is a natural consequence of the definition and interpre-
tation of a dummy in Sect. 2.4. It is similar in spirit to the Null-Player-Out
property of Derks and Haller (1999), in that it requires that dummies not only
have zero power (which is a direct consequence of DP) but can be left out, in
the way specified, without changing the power of the remaining players. In
Section 3.3 we will demonstrate that it is not sufficient to require only that
dummies have zero power.
The third axiom is a standard anonymity requirement, expressing that it
should not matter how the players in a spatial game are called. Let N ⊆ N be
finite and let σ : N → N be an injective function. For a spatial game (N, v, p)
define the spatial game (σ(N), σv, σp) by σv(σ(S)) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N and
(σp)σ(i) = pi for all i ∈ N .
Anonymity (AN) For every spatial game (N, v, p) and every injective function
σ : N → N, ϕσ(i)(σ(N), σv, σp) = ϕi(N, v, p) for all i ∈ N .
The last two axioms concern constellations. The first implies that it does
not matter where in R2 the constellation is located. It is a natural consequence
of the assumption that for a power index all potential issues are taken into
consideration and are regarded equally likely, so that only the relative positions
of the players matter. Without this condition, other distributions of issues than
the uniform one become possible. (Cf. Section 3.3.)
Reflection Invariance (RI) For every spatial game (N, v, p) and every line ℓ
in R2, ϕ(N, v, p) = ϕ(N, v, pℓ).
The final axiom reflects the consideration that what matters in a constella-
tion are the relative positions of the players as expressed by the lines connecting
them. The axiom states that the power of a player i does not change if the
position pj of another player j moves along the line through pi and pj without
passing pi. Note that this implies that the order of precedence of the projections
of pi and pj on any line does not change. Thus, while all five axioms will be
crucial for obtaining the Owen-Shapley spatial power index – see Sect. 3.3 – the
final axiom perhaps most closely reflects the idea underlying this index.
Positional Invariance (PI) For all player sets N , i ∈ N , and p, p′ ∈ PN , if
p′i = pi and p
′
j ∈ [pi, pj ,→) for all j ∈ N \ {i}, then ϕi(N, v, p) = ϕi(N, v, p
′)
for all (N, v) ∈ VN .
Positional Invariance expresses that issues are identified with lines: if position
pj moves along the line through pi and pj in the direction of pi or away from
pi, then the relative positions of i and j with respect to the issue represented
by that line do not change.
3.2 The characterization
The main result of this paper is the following.
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Theorem 3.1. The Owen-Shapley spatial power index Φ is the unique spatial
power index satisfying EPC, DP, AN, RI, and PI.
We first show that Φ satisfies the five axioms in the theorem.
Lemma 3.2. Φ satisfies EPC.
Proof. To show that Φ satisfies EPC, let p ∈ PN and let v, v′, w, w′ be simple
games with player set N , satisfying v − v′ = w − w′ ≥ 0. It is sufficient to
consider the case where v arises from v′ and w from w′ by adding the minimal
winning coalition S. First consider a player i ∈ S. Then v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ) ≥
v′(T∪{i})−v′(T ) and w(T∪{i})−w(T ) ≥ w′(T∪{i})−w′(T ) for all T ⊆ N\{i}.
This implies that, according to Φ, player i can never lose power when going from
v′ to v and from w′ to w. Player i gains, when going from v′ to v, at an r ∈ U
where he is not pivotal according to v′ but pivotal according to v. Suppose the
induced ordering at such an r is i1, . . . , in (where n = |N |), player it is pivotal
according to v′, S ⊆ {i1, . . . , it−1}, and i is the last player of S in this ordering,
say i = is for some s ≤ t − 1. Then {i1, . . . , is} is losing in v
′ and winning in
v, and therefore losing in w′ and winning in w. Also, {i1, . . . , is−1} is losing in
v′, v, w′, and therefore also in w. Thus, player i is pivotal according to v and
according to w but not according to v′ and w′. Hence, the gain in power for
player 1 at this particular ordering when going from v′ to v and when going
from w′ to w is equal to the share of the vectors r ∈ U inducing this ordering,
which depends exclusively on the constellation p. We conclude that the gain of
each player i ∈ S when going from v′ to v and when going from w′ to w is the
same.
Next, let i /∈ S. Now player i can only lose when going from v′ to v and from
w′ to w. Player i loses, when going from v′ to v, at an r ∈ U where he is pivotal
according to v′ but not pivotal according to v. Suppose the induced ordering
at such an r is i1, . . . , in (where n = |N |), player i = it is pivotal according to
v′, and S ⊆ {i1, . . . , it−1}, so that player i is no longer pivotal according to v.
Since S is also winning in w, player i is also not pivotal according to w. Since
{i1, . . . , it−1} is losing in v
′ and winning in v, it must be losing in w′; and since
{i1, . . . , it} is winning in v
′, v, and w, it must be winning in w′. Hence, player i
is pivotal according to w′. Hence, the loss in power for player 1 at this particular
ordering when going from v′ to v and when going from w′ to w is equal to the
share of the vectors r ∈ U inducing this ordering, which depends exclusively on
the constellation p. We conclude that the loss of each player i ∈ S when going
from v′ to v and when going from w′ to w is the same. 
Lemma 3.3. Φ satisfies DP, AN, RI, and PI.
Proof. Let (N, v, p) be a spatial game. If player i is a dummy, i.e., pi ∈ co ({pj |
j ∈ S \ {i}}) for every coalition S in which i is pivotal, then the projection of
pi on any line ℓ is in between the projections of other players in S, for every S
in which i is pivotal. Hence, player i is pivotal at at most finitely many r ∈ U .
Thus, Φi(N, v, p) = 0 and nothing changes for the other players if we leave out
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player i from (N, v) and pi from p, i.e., ϕj(N, v, p) = ϕj(N \ {i}, v−i, p−i) for
every j ∈ N \ {i}. Hence, Φ satisfies DP.
AN of Φ is obvious by definition. For RI, suppose that player i in (N, v, p) is
pivotal at some r ∈ U . Let ℓ be a line in R2, and let m be the line through the
origin parallel to ℓ. Then it is easy to check that player i is pivotal at rm ∈ U in
the spatial game (N, v, pℓ). Since this holds for every player i and every r ∈ U ,
RI of Φ follows.
Finally, let p′ ∈ PN and i ∈ N such that p′i = pi and p
′
j ∈ [pi, pj ,→) for
all j ∈ N \ {i}. Then, for every r ∈ U , player i is pivotal at r in (N, v, p) if
and only if he is pivotal at r in (N, v, p′), since the set of preceding players of
player i does not change. Therefore, ϕi(N, v, p) = ϕi(N, v, p
′), and PI of Φ is
proved. 
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply that the Owen-Shapley spatial power index sat-
isfies the five axioms in the theorem. We now show uniqueness.
The next lemma implies that, if ϕ satisfies EPC, then it is completely deter-
mined by its value on unanimity games as defined in Example 2.1. The lemma
follows from Lemma 2.3 in Einy (1987), see also Einy and Haimanko (2011).
Lemma 3.4. Let ϕ be a spatial power index satisfying EPC and let (N, v, p)
be a spatial game. Let T1, . . . , Tk be the minimal winning coalitions in (N, v).
Then
ϕ(N, v, p) =
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,k}
(−1)|I|+1ϕ(N,u∪m∈ITm , p) .
Until further notice, ϕ is a spatial power index satisfying DP, AN, RI, and
PI.
Lemma 3.5. Let (N,uT , p) be a spatial game, where ∅ 6= T ⊆ N . Let T
′ ⊆
N be the set of non-dummies. Then ϕi(N, v, p) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ T
′ and
ϕi(N,uT , p) = ϕi(T
′, uT ′ , p
′) for all i ∈ T ′, where p′ is the restriction of p to
T ′.
Proof. Clearly, T ′ ⊆ T . Let j ∈ N \ T ′, then ϕi(N,uT , p) = ϕi(N \
{j}, (uT )−j , p−j) for all i ∈ N \ {j} by DP. In particular, ϕj(N, v, p) = 1 −∑
i∈N\{j} ϕi(N \ {j}, (uT )−j , p−j) = 1 − 1 = 0; and ϕi(N,uT , p) = ϕi(N \
{j}, uT\{j}, p−j) for all i ∈ N \ {j}. Also, T
′ is still the set of non-dummies in
(N \{j}, uT\{j}, p−j). The lemma now follows from repeated application of this
argument. 
In view of Lemma 3.5 we may restrict attention to spatial games of the form
(N,uN , p) and having no dummies. The next lemma establishes a very useful
consequence of AN and RI for this kind of spatial game.
Lemma 3.6. Let (N,uN , p) be a spatial game and suppose that for two distinct
players i and j with ℓ the perpendicular bisector of [pi, pj ] we have {p
ℓ
k | k ∈
N} = {pk | k ∈ N}. Then ϕi(N,uN , p) = ϕj(N,uN , p).
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p1 p2
p3p4
q4
Figure 2: Illustrating the proof of Lemma 3.8
Proof. Consider σ : N → N defined by σ(k) = k′ if pk′ = p
ℓ
k. By AN,
ϕi(N,uN , p) = ϕσ(i)(N,σuN , σp) = ϕj(N,uN , p
ℓ). By RI, ϕj(N,uN , p
ℓ) =
ϕj(N,uN , p). Hence ϕi(N,uN , p) = ϕj(N,uN , p). 
Lemma 3.7. Let (N,uN , p) be a spatial game. If |N | = 1 or |N | = 2 then
ϕ(N,uN , p) = Φ(N,uN , p).
Proof. Observe that in both cases there are no dummies. If |N | = {i} then
clearly ϕi(N,uN , p) = Φi(N,uN , p) = 1. If N = {i, j} with j 6= i then
ϕi(N,uN , p) = ϕj(N,uN , p) by Lemma 3.6. This holds also for Φ, and we
obtain Φi(N,uN , p) = Φj(N,uN , p) = ϕi(N,uN , p) = ϕj(N,uN , p) =
1
2 . 
Lemma 3.8. Let |N | = 3, k ∈ N , p ∈ PN , and let co ({pi | i ∈ N}) have a
right angle at pk. Then ϕk(N,uN , p) = Φk(N,uN , p) =
1
4 .
Proof. (Cf. Figure 2.) Without loss of generality let N = {1, 2, 3} with k = 2
and consider an additional player 4 with p4 ∈ R
2 such that co ({pi | i ∈ N ∪
{4}}) is a rectangle with vertex p4 opposite of p2. Consider the spatial game
(N ∪{4}, uN∪{4}, p). By Lemma 3.6 we obtain ϕ1(N ∪{4}, uN∪{4}, p) = ϕ2(N ∪
{4}, uN∪{4}, p), and similarly ϕ2(N ∪{4}, uN∪{4}, p) = ϕ3(N ∪{4}, uN∪{4}, p) =
ϕ4(N ∪{4}, uN∪{4}, p), so that ϕi(N ∪{4}, uN∪{4}, p) =
1
4 for every i = 1, . . . , 4.
Next consider the spatial game (N ∪ {4}, uN∪{4}, q), where qi = pi for
i = 1, 2, 3 and q4 =
1
2p1 +
1
2p3. By PI, ϕ2(N ∪ {4}, uN∪{4}, q) = ϕ2(N ∪
{4}, uN∪{4}, p) =
1
4 . Since player 4 is a dummy in (N∪{4}, uN∪{4}, q), we obtain
ϕ2(N,uN , p) = ϕ2(N, (uN∪{4})−4, q−4) = ϕ2(N∪{4}, uN∪{4}, q) =
1
4 , where the
second equality follows from DP. The same argument (or Example 2.1) applies
to Φ. 
In what follows we use the notation ∡xyz for the size of the (smaller) angle,
measured in radians, at y between the line through x and y and the line through
z and y. The following lemma and its proof are illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Illustrating Lemma 3.9 and its proof
Lemma 3.9. Let a, b, c, and d be four distinct points in R2 such that b and
c are on different sides of the line through a and d, and ∡ bad + ∡ cad < π.
Let N = {i, j, k}, |N | = 3, and let p, q, s ∈ PN be defined by p = (pi, pj , pk) =
(a, b, c), q = (qi, qj , qk) = (a, b, d), and s = (si, sj , sk) = (a, d, c), Then
ϕi(N,uN , p) = ϕi(N,uN , q) + ϕi(N,uN , s)−
1
2
.
If, additionally, ∡ bad = ∡ cad, then
ϕi(N,uN , p) = 2ϕi(N,uN , q)−
1
2
.
Proof. Take a point x in the open line segment between a and d, such that the
line through x perpendicular to the line through a and d intersects the open
line segment between a and b in a point y and the open line segment between a
and c in a point z. By PI it is sufficient to prove that
ϕi(N,uN , p˜) = ϕi(N,uN , q˜) + ϕi(N,uN , s˜)−
1
2
,
and
ϕi(N,uN , p˜) = 2ϕi(N,uN , q˜)−
1
2
if ∡ bad = ∡ cad, where p˜ = (p˜i, p˜j , p˜k) = (a, y, z), q˜ = (q˜i, q˜j , q˜k) = (a, y, x),
and s˜ = (s˜i, s˜j , s˜k) = (a, x, z). Now
ϕj(N,uN , p˜) = ϕj(N,uN , q˜) =
3
4
− ϕi(N,uN , q˜) , (1)
where the first equality follows from PI and the second from Lemma 3.8. By
analogous arguments,
ϕk(N,uN , p˜) = ϕk(N,uN , s˜) =
3
4
− ϕi(N,uN , s˜) . (2)
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Combining (1) and (2) we obtain
ϕi(N,uN , p˜) = 1− ϕj(N,uN , p˜)− ϕk(N,uN , p˜)
= ϕi(N,uN , q˜) + ϕi(N,uN , s˜)−
1
2
,
which completes the proof of the first statement. Now suppose, additionally,
that ∡ bad = ∡ cad. Then by Lemma 3.6 we have ϕj(N,uN , p˜) = ϕk(N,uN , p˜).
By (1) and (2) this implies ϕi(N,uN , q˜) = ϕi(N,uN , s˜), and the second state-
ment in the lemma follows. 
Lemma 3.10. Let N = {i, j, k}, |N | = 3, and let p ∈ PN such that ∡ pjpipk =
m
2h
π for some h,m ∈ N with m < 2h. Then ϕi(N,uN , p) =
1
2 −
m
2h+1
.
Proof. First suppose m = 1. If h = 1 then ϕi(N,uN , p) =
1
4 by Lemma 3.8.
Assume that the statement has been proved for h, then for h + 1 we have by
the second statement in Lemma 3.9 that
1
2
−
1
2h+1
= 2ϕi(N,uN , p)−
1
2
,
hence ϕi(N,uN , p) =
1
2−
1
2h+2
. By induction the statement in the lemma follows
for m = 1 and all h ∈ N. Now suppose the statement in the lemma has been
proved for m and arbitrary h such that m+1 < 2h, Then by the first statement
in Lemma 3.9 we obtain for m+ 1
ϕi(N,uN , p) =
(
1
2
−
1
2h+1
)
+
(
1
2
−
m
2h+1
)
−
1
2
=
1
2
−
m+ 1
2h+1
and the proof of the lemma is complete by induction. 
Let
A =
{m
2h
π | h,m ∈ N, m < 2h
}
.
With some abuse of notation we will write ϕ(α) := ϕi(N,uN , p) for (N,uN , p)
as in Lemma 3.10, where α = ∡ pjpipk ∈ A. Observe that A is a dense subset
of the interval (0, π) and that ϕ : A → (0, 12 ),
m
2h
π 7→ 12 −
m
2h+1
is a decreasing
continuous function. Note that ϕ(α) = π−α2π for every α ∈ A.
Next, we extend these findings to all of (0, π).
Lemma 3.11. Let a, b, c, and d be four distinct points in R2 such that d and
b are on different sides of the line through a and c, and 0 < ∡ cab < ∡ dab < π.
Let N = {i, j, k}, |N | = 3, let p = (pi, pj , pk) = (a, b, c) and let q = (qi, qj , qk) =
(a, b, d). Then ϕi(N,uN , p) ≥ ϕi(N,uN , q).
Proof. By PI we may assume that the line m through b and d is perpendicular
to the line ℓ through a and c and that these two lines intersect in c. See
Figure 4 for an illustration of this and of the later part of the proof. Without
loss of generality we assume i = 1, j = 2, k = 3.
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Figure 4: Illustrating the proof of Lemma 3.11
Consider the spatial game (N ∪ {4}, uN∪{4}, (a, b, e, d)), where e = a
m. By
PI and DP we obtain
ϕ2(N ∪ {4}, uN∪{4}, (a, b, e, d)) = ϕ2(N,uN , (a, b, e)) (3)
which can be seen by moving the location d of player 4 to c along m. Since
ϕ1(N,uN , (a, b, e)) = ϕ3(N,uN , (a, b, e)) by Lemma 3.6, we have
ϕ2(N,uN , (a, b, e)) = 1− 2ϕ1(N,uN , (a, b, e)) . (4)
Since also ϕ1(N ∪ {4}, uN∪{4}, (a, b, e, d)) = ϕ3(N ∪ {4}, uN∪{4}, (a, b, e, d)) by
Lemma 3.6, we obtain
ϕ2(N ∪ {4}, uN∪{4}, (a, b, e, d)) = 1− 2ϕ1(N ∪ {4}, uN∪{4}, (a, b, e, d))
−ϕ4(N ∪ {4}, uN∪{4}, (a, b, e, d)) . (5)
Combining (3), (4), (5) and the assumption that ϕ4(N∪{4}, uN∪{4}, (a, b, e, d)) ≥
0, we obtain
ϕ1(N,uN , (a, b, e)) ≥ ϕ1(N ∪ {4}, uN∪{4}, (a, b, e, d)) . (6)
By PI, ϕ1(N,uN , (a, b, e)) = ϕ1(N,uN , (a, b, c)) and by PI and DP, ϕ1(N ∪
{4}, uN∪{4}, (a, b, e, d)) = ϕ1({1, 2, 4}, u{1,2,4}, (a, b, d). Together with (6) we
have ϕ1(N,uN , (a, b, c)) ≥ ϕ1({1, 2, 4}, u{1,2,4}, (a, b, d), hence by AN, ϕ1(N,
uN , (a, b, c)) ≥ ϕ1(N,uN , (a, b, d). 
Lemma 3.11 in fact states that in a spatial game (N,uN , p) with three players
and the points pk forming a triangle, the power of player i decreases as the
angle at the point pi increases. Combined with Lemma 3.10 and the discussion
following it we thus obtain the following result.
Corollary 3.12. Let N = {i, j, k}, |N | = 3, and let p ∈ PN . Then for each
i ∈ N ,
Φi(N,uN , p) = ϕi(N,uN , p) =
π − ∡ pjpipk
2π
.
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The case with an arbitrary number of players now follows easily.
Corollary 3.13. Let (N,uN , p) be a spatial game without dummies and let
i, j, k ∈ N such that pj and pk are adjacent to pi. Then
Φi(N,uN , p) = ϕi(N,uN , p) =
π − ∡ pjpipk
2π
.
Proof. By PI and DP, ϕi(N,uN , p) = ϕi({i, j, k}, u{i,j,k}, (pi, pj , pk)). The
claim now follows from Corollary 3.12. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1 By Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3, Φ satisfies all the axioms in the
theorem. The converse follows from Corollary 3.13 and Lemma 3.5, combined
with Lemma 3.4. 
3.3 Independence of the axioms
The following spatial power indices show that the axioms in Theorem 3.1 are
logically independent.
(1) Define
ϕ1(N, v, p) =
1
2k − 1
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,k}
Φ(N,u∪m∈ITm , p) ,
for every spatial game (N, v, p), where T1, . . . , Tk are the minimal winning coali-
tions in (N, v) (cf. Lemma 3.4). Then ϕ1 satisfies all the axioms in Theorem 3.1
except EPC.
(2) Define ϕ2i (N, v, p) = 1/|N | for every spatial game (N, v, p) and every i ∈ N .
Then ϕ2 satisfies all the axioms in Theorem 3.1 except DP.
(3) For every spatial game (N,uT , p) where the set of non-dummies is equal
to {1, 2}, let ϕ31(N,uT , p) =
1
4 , ϕ
3
2(N,uT , p) =
3
4 , and ϕ
3
i (N,uT , p) = 0 for all
i ∈ N \ {1, 2}. In all other cases, let ϕ3(N,uT , p) = Φ(N,uT , p). Extend ϕ
3 to
a spatial power index by using the formula in Lemma 3.4. Then ϕ3 satisfies all
the axioms in Theorem 3.1 except AN.
(4) For every spatial game (N, v, p), let Nnd(N, v, p) be the set of non-dummies,
and let ϕ4 assign 1 to player i such that pi is lexicographically maximal among
all pj , j ∈ N (so pi has maximal second coordinate among all points pj with
maximal first coordinate); and 0 to all other players. Then ϕ4 satisfies all the
axioms in Theorem 3.1 except RI. Observe that ϕ4 can be seen as resulting from
the Dirac distribution that puts probability one on the issue (1, 0), using the
second coordinate of positions for tie-breaking.
(5) Define
ϕ5i (N, v, p) =
{ 1
|Nnd|
if i ∈ Nnd
0 otherwise.
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Then ϕ5 satisfies all the axioms in Theorem 3.1 except PI. To see the latter,
suppose N = {1, . . . , 4}, p1 = (0, 0), p2 = (1, 1), p3 = (2, 2), p4 = (0, 2), and
p′ = p except that p′1 = (0, 1). Then ϕ
5
4(N,uN , p) =
1
3 whereas ϕ
5
4(N,uN , p
′) =
1
4 .
Remark 3.14. We show that also the (implicit) nonnegativity requirement on
a spatial power index cannot be dispensed with. Recall that this condition is
(only) used in the proof of Lemma 3.11, which shows that the power of a player
i decreases if the angle at the extreme point pi of the polytope of the player
positions increases. Without Lemma 3.11 we still have that ϕi(N,uN , p) =
1
2 (1−
q) for a spatial game (N,uN , p) without dummies, if the angle at pi is equal to qπ
for some q = m/2h, h,m ∈ N, m < 2h. We will now define a power index which
still satisfies this property and all axioms in Theorem 3.1, with sum of the powers
of the players equal to one, but which violates nonnegativity. To this end, let g :
R → R be an additive function (i.e., g(x+y) = g(x)+g(y) for all x, y ∈ R) such
that g(x) = x for all x ∈ Q but not for all x ∈ R.5 We construct a spatial power
index ψ by defining it for all (N,uN , p), N ⊆ N, such that no player i ∈ N is a
dummy. By DP and EPC, ψ is then extended to all spatial games. Let (N,uN , p)
be a spatial game without dummies. Let the angle at pi, i ∈ N , be xiπ. Then
we define ψi(N,uN , p) =
1
2 (1 − g(xi)) for all i ∈ N . Since ψ depends only on
the angles in the polytope determined by the constellation p, it follows that
ψ satisfies AN, RI, and PI. Also,
∑
i∈N ψi(N,uN , p) =
1
2 (|N | − g(
∑
i∈N xi)) =
1
2 (|N |−(|N |−2)) = 1, where the first equality follows from additivity of g. Since
g(x) 6= x for some x ∈ R, it follows that ψ 6= Φ. Consequently, nonnegativity
must be violated.
Remark 3.15. The usual dummy condition would only require that dummy
players obtain zero. We now show that this condition would not be sufficient to
characterize the Owen-Shapley spatial power index. Define the power index ψ
as follows: for every spatial game (N, v, p),
ψ(N, v, p) =
{
Φ(N, v, p) if |N | 6= 3
ϕ5(N, v, p) if |N | = 3,
where ϕ5 was defined above: for |N | = 3, ϕ5 still satisfies PI. The spatial power
index ψ satisfies EPC, AN, RI, and PI, but not DP; however, it satisfies the
weaker requirement that dummies obtain zero. Observe that, for |N | = 3, ψ is
not continuous in the constellation p : if none of the players is a dummy but
one of the positions converges to a dummy position then the associated power
remains at 13 and thus does not converge to zero.
4 Concluding remarks
We characterized the Owen-Shapley spatial power index by means of five axioms.
A limitation of our approach is that it is restricted to constellations and issues in
5The existence of such a function g can be shown using the Axiom of Choice.
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R2. It is straightforward to extend the axioms to the case of constellations and
issues in Rm form > 2, and it is safe to conjecture that the Owen-Shapley spatial
power index satisfies these extended axioms. A proof of an eventual converse,
however, seems to be more involved. Imposing continuity with respect to the
constellation while weakening the dummy property DP to the requirement that
dummies obtain zero might help here, cf. Remark 3.15.
As far as we are aware, this is a first axiomatic characterization of a spatial
power index. Further research may concern characterizations of alternative
power indexes, as proposed in the literature.
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